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Regional growth-management planning makes
housing unaffordable and contributes to a busi-
ness-unfriendly environment that slows economic
growth. The high housing prices caused by growth-
management planning were an essential element of
the housing bubble that has recently shaken our
economy: for the most part, this bubble was limit-
ed to urban regions with growth-management
planning.
In 2006, the price of a median home in the 10
states that have passed laws requiring local gov-
ernments to do growth-management planning
was five times the median family income in those
states. At that price, a median family devoting 31
percent of its income (the maximum allowed for
FHA-insured loans) to a mortgage at 6 percent,
with a 10 percent down payment, could not pay
off the mortgage on a median home in less than
59 years. In contrast, a median home in the 22
states that have no growth-management laws or
institutions cost only 2.7 times the median fam-
ily income. This meant a family could pay off a
home in just 12.5 years.
Growth-management tools such as urban-
growth boundaries, adequate-public-facilities ordi-
nances, and growth limits all drive up the cost of
housing by artificially restricting the amount of
land available or the number of permits granted
for home construction. On average, homebuyers in
2006 had to pay $130,000 more for every home
sold in states with mandatory growth-manage-
ment planning than they would have had to pay if
home price-to-income ratios were less than 3. This
is, in effect, a planning tax that increases the costs of
retail, commercial, and industrial developments as
well as housing.
The key to keeping housing affordable is the
presence of large amounts of relatively unregulat-
ed vacant land that can be developed for housing
and other purposes. The availability of such low-
cost land encourages cities to keep housing
affordable within their boundaries. But when
state or other planning institutions allow cities to
gain control over the rate of development or rural
areas, they lose this incentive, and housing quick-
ly becomes unaffordable. States with growth-
management laws should repeal them, and other
states should avoid passing them.
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Introduction
More than two out of three Americans live
in an urbanized area, which the Census Bureau
defines as “a densely settled area that has a cen-
sus population of at least 50,000.”1 Urbanized
areas are identified by the name of the most
prominent city or cities in the area, such as St.
Louis or Minneapolis–St. Paul. But, in fact,
most urban areas are made up of dozens, and
sometimes hundreds, of municipal units of
government, including cities, towns, villages,
counties, and special districts of various kinds.
What is the best way to govern these urban-
ized areas? Should cities and other municipal
governments be allowed to compete with one
another for residents, businesses, and funding
from state and federal governments? Or
should planning and certain other regional
functions be given to a regional government
that oversees each urban area?
Many planners and some economists have
argued that regional governments are better
suited than local governments to solving
problems such as housing. Urban planners say
that regional governments can make cities and
their suburbs more livable and affordable for
both businesses and residents. Planners specif-
ically oppose leap-frog development, in which a
developer builds housing or other develop-
ment on land that is physically separated from
existing urbanized land. More recently, plan-
ners have tried to discourage all greenfield
development, even if it is physically next to
existing urbanized land, preferring instead in-
fill development, or development of vacant
parcels within an urban area. 
One of the major claims for infill develop-
ment is that it is less expensive than develop-
ment on the urban fringe. A 2002 report from
the Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy
Research titled The Costs of Sprawl—2000 esti-
mated that low-density suburban development
at the urban fringe imposes about $11,000
more in urban-service costs on communities
than more compact development.2
To avoid such costs, planners favor a form
of planning known as growth-management plan-
ning, which uses urban-growth or urban-service
boundaries, rules requiring adequate financing
for urban services before the issuance of build-
ing permits, and similar tools to direct growth
to certain areas and away from areas designat-
ed as preserves or reserves. 
Economists have focused on specific urban
problems. Harvard economist Edward Glaeser
sees regional governments as a solution to
housing affordability problems. “Land use
regulations seem to drive housing supply and
determine which regions are growing,” Glaeser
observes. “A more regional approach to hous-
ing supply might reduce the tendency of many
localities to block new construction” (empha-
sis added).3
Despite these claims and speculations, there
has been little research showing whether
regional governments can actually make urban
areas more attractive and more affordable. As
UC Berkeley political scientist Margaret Weir
observes, the literature on regional govern-
ments “does not connect regional processes
with regional outcomes, [so] we do not know
enough about what makes regions successful.”4
Another argument for planning is that
there are certain problems that are regional,
and only a regional government staffed by
regional planners can solve those problems.
This argument has been strongly promoted by
former Albuquerque mayor David Rusk.5 In
fact, most of the supposedly regional prob-
lems—including housing, open space, solid
waste, infrastructure, and transportation—can
easily be handled at the local level. The few
problems that are difficult to solve locally are
not made any easier by magnifying those
problems to a regional scale. As Jane Jacobs
wryly observed, a region is “an area safely larg-
er than the last one to whose problems we
found no solution.”6
A close look at the data for America’s
urbanized areas reveals that regional growth-
management planning generally does not pro-
duce the benefits claimed for it. States and
regions with strong regional governments
tend to have the least affordable housing and
are often growing more slowly than regions
with weak regional governments. This sug-
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gests that state and local officials should dis-
mantle or avoid regional governments, and in
particular regional growth-management plan-
ning.
A History of Regional
Government
Regional government was a moot point
during most of the 19th century, when urban
Americans nearly all lived in cities and those
cities readily annexed new developments that
took place on their fringes. But in 1873,
Brookline, Massachusetts, became the first
suburb to reject a major city’s offer to be
annexed.7 This started a trend that soon led to
a clear split between the center cities and their
suburbs. 
By the mid-20th century, many suburban-
ites viewed the cities as cesspools of corrup-
tion, and they didn’t want to see their taxes
going into the pockets of aldermen or their
contractor friends. Most states did not allow
cities to annex without the permission of the
people being annexed, and that permission
was often difficult to obtain.
Central city officials, meanwhile, complain-
ed that the average income of the people who
moved to the suburbs was higher than the peo-
ple left behind, which tended to mean lower tax
revenues for the cities. The cities came to view
suburbanites as parasites, enjoying the eco-
nomic and cultural benefits of the cities with-
out paying their full share of the costs.
Urban planners who advocated regional
government were not primarily concerned
with municipal finance. They spoke instead
of “rapid and often chaotic growth,” which
they contrasted with their “visions of pro-
moting orderly urban regions with planned
communities and efficient infrastructure sys-
tems.”8 “Central cities and suburbs are inter-
dependent and cannot survive in the present
governmental and physical chaos,” argued
one planning professor.9 The repeated use of
vague terms like “chaos” and “order” sug-
gests that planners were trying to make their
ideas attractive to a broad range of people
without explicitly stating just what their
ideas really were.
Planners, however, had few tools that they
could use to promote their idea of orderly
growth, whatever that was. The first zoning
codes, passed by New York City in 1919 and
other cities soon after, focused on maintain-
ing the existing character and quality of
neighborhoods of single-family homes.
When a real estate developer in Euclid, Ohio,
challenged one of these zoning codes, it was
overturned by lower courts as an unconstitu-
tional taking of property without compensa-
tion. When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the court rejected arguments by the
city of Euclid that the code was needed to
preserve the character of the neighborhood.
However, the court agreed with the argument
of an intervener that the code was a constitu-
tional exercise of police powers to prevent
nuisances.10
If zoning could be used only to prevent
nuisances, then regional planners would
have little ability to control growth. It might
be easy to show that pollution-emitting fac-
tory in the middle of a residential neighbor-
hood would be a nuisance, but it would be
much harder to show that someone develop-
ing vacant land on the edge of a city was cre-
ating a nuisance.
Cities could exercise some control over de-
velopment by limiting the expansion of urban
services such as sewer and water. However,
they could not prevent developers from pro-
viding their own sewer, water, and other ser-
vices by creating special service districts or
incorporating their own cities. As long as de-
velopers had such freedom, regional planners
were helpless to direct or control new develop-
ment. 
One response was the idea of city-city or city-
county consolidations. Such consolidations
would give the central city greater control over
what happened in areas that were previously
outside of its jurisdiction. Before World War II,
several cities were able to persuade some or all
of their suburbs to consolidate, including New
York City (1898), Denver (1902), and Honolulu
(1907). But suburbs of Oakland, St. Louis,
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Pittsburgh, and several other regions rejected
such consolidations. After World War II, Baton
Rouge (1947), Newport News (1952), Virginia
Beach and Nashville (1962), Jacksonville,
Florida (1967), Anchorage (1975), Kansas City
(1997), and Louisville (2003) all consolidated
with their county governments. However, vot-
ers rejected many other proposed consolida-
tions, including those in Birmingham, Miami,
Albuquerque, Memphis, St. Louis, Portland,
and Sacramento.11
Congress struck a blow for regional gov-
ernment when the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1962 included a requirement that the various
cities in urban areas work together on a “con-
tinuing, comprehensive and cooperative”
transportation planning process. Similarly,
the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1965 required urban areas to form “organiza-
tions composed of public officials . . . repre-
sentative of the political jurisdictions within a
metropolitan or urban region.” Regions that
wanted to receive federal transportation and
housing grants had to meet these require-
ments, and the reasoning at the time was that
it would be easier for federal agencies to allo-
cate grants among a few hundred urban areas
than to decide among proposals from tens of
thousands of municipal governments.
The 224 urbanized areas at the time quick-
ly formed metropolitan planning organizations
(MPOs). Sometimes called “councils of gov-
ernments,” “regional planning commissions,”
or similar names, these MPOs typically are
governed by elected officials from most or all
of the cities and counties in the region.
Initially, most MPOs were little more than
committees with post office boxes, and they
did little other than distribute federal trans-
portation and housing grants to local govern-
ments. But over time, most have grown to
employ dozens or hundreds of urban plan-
ners, and a few exercise near-dictatorial con-
trols over planning and zoning of much of
the land in their regions.
The Supreme Court gave planners a new
tool in 1978 when it decided the case of Penn
Central v. New York City. Penn Central wanted
to build an office tower above its Grand
Central Terminal, but New York City’s historic
landmarks law prevented it. The city did not
claim that the office tower would create a nui-
sance. In essence, it argued instead that the
building would change the character of the
area. Penn Central argued that its passenger
terminal lost money, and a rule prohibiting it
from building an office tower was an uncon-
stitutional taking of its property without com-
pensation. The court sided with the city, say-
ing that even if the terminal lost money, Penn
Central should use its revenue from its other
real estate to cover those losses.12
In short, the Supreme Court overturned
the Euclid ruling and authorized cities to
downzone people’s property, effectively tak-
ing away most of the economic value of that
property, without compensation, even if the
downzoning was not needed to prevent a
nuisance. That led to a dramatic escalation in
regional planning and zoning.
Despite the federal laws, the real impetus
behind the growth in regional government has
been from state laws. Several states—notably
California, Oregon, Washington, and Florida
—have passed laws requiring some form of
regional planning in some or all urban areas in
the states. Other state legislatures have autho-
rized, but not required, such planning. Many
other states provide no framework for region-
al planning or governance. These differences
make it possible to compare the effects of
regional government on such things as hous-
ing affordability and growth. 
The Evolution of 
Growth-Management
Planning
Until 1970, urban growth and develop-
ment in the United States was driven almost
entirely by landowners and developers who
were responding to market demands for resi-
dential, commercial, retail, and industrial uses.
Once an area was developed, cities used zon-
ing to provide homeowners and other
landowners assurance that the character of
their neighborhoods would not dramatically
4
In the 1978 Penn
Central decision,
the Supreme
Court authorized
cities to take most
of the economic
value of private
property without
compensation.
change through the intrusion of some incom-
patible use. Vacant lands were either unzoned
or placed in a low-density “holding zone” that
cities would readily change when landowners
or developers presented proposals to develop
the lands.
Growing concerns over environmental
issues combined with fears that existing resi-
dents were somehow subsidizing growth led to
a transformation of planning starting in 1970.
In that year, Ramapo, New York, a suburb of
New York City, passed the first adequate public
facilities ordinance, also known as a concurrency
ordinance. Instead of allowing developers to
build homes and commercial areas and then
providing the sewer, water, and other urban
services needed by those areas, Ramapo decid-
ed that it would approve new developments
only after the capital improvements needed for
the development were fully financed.13
In 1972, the city of Petaluma, California,
took a different approach. Instead of condi-
tioning growth on urban finances, the city
simply decided to issue no more than 500 res-
idential building permits a year.14 Soon after,
Boulder, Colorado, decided to limit the num-
ber of building permits so that it would grow
no faster than 2 percent per year. Boulder was
also the first city in the United States to pass a
tax dedicated to open space preservation, and
the city and county of Boulder have since pur-
chased a greenbelt around the city that is sev-
eral times the land area of the city itself.15
In 1974, San Jose and Santa Clara County
(of which San Jose is the seat) drew one of the
first urban-growth boundaries outside of
which development would be prohibited or
restricted. Other places have used urban-ser-
vice boundaries that limit the extension of
sewer, water, and other services, effectively
preventing large-scale developments.
All of these practices—concurrency, growth
limits, greenbelts, and growth boundaries—are
collectively known as growth-management plan-
ning. While Petaluma and Boulder have tried
to control the rate of growth, most growth
management focuses instead on controlling
the location and density of growth. This varia-
tion of growth management is sometimes
called smart growth. Also, as practiced by
Petaluma and Boulder, growth management
can simply drive growth to other nearby com-
munities. So planners in recent decades have
focused on creating regional structures that
can manage growth throughout an urbanized
area and the rural lands beyond its fringes.
Regional growth-management planning
plays a major role in the development of sev-
enteen to nineteen different states plus sever-
al urban areas in other states. Growth man-
agement has evolved in these states and
urban areas in five different ways.
First, 10 states have passed planning laws
requiring local and regional planners to coordi-
nate the development of growth-management
plans. These states include Hawaii (1961), Ver-
mont (1970), Oregon (1973), Florida (1985),
New Jersey (1986), Rhode Island (1988), Wash-
ington (1990), Maryland (1992), Tennessee
(1998), and Arizona (1998). In Hawaii’s case, the
state itself writes the plan. 
Second, seven states have passed laws auth-
orizing but not requiring cities and counties to
write growth-management plans. Usually,
these laws are accompanied by incentives that
may range from grants to support the develop-
ment of the plan to limits on the use of state
infrastructure funds in communities that have
not written a plan. These states include Con-
necticut (1971), Maine (1988), Georgia (1989),
Minnesota (1997), New Hampshire (1999),
Pennsylvania (1999), and Wisconsin (2000).
Washington’s 1990 law is unique in that it is
mandatory in the western half of the state and
optional in the eastern half.
Third, in California and New England,
institutional structures that were not original-
ly designed to be regional governments have
evolved into mechanisms for implementing
growth-management plans. In 1963, various
California urban areas had seen disputes over
which city would get to annex developable
land. So California required every county
(except San Francisco, which has no compet-
ing jurisdictions) to form a local agency forma-
tion commission or LAFCo that would approve
such annexations. LAFCos could also veto the
incorporation of new cities or special service
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districts, thus giving cities control over the rate
of development on unincorporated county
lands. Each LAFCo consisted of representa-
tives of every city in the county, so by the early
1970s LAFCos morphed into regional govern-
ments that attempted to manage growth and
limit sprawl.16
The six New England states (Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Vermont) have largely given up the
county form of government and turned most
rural planning over to cities and towns.
Connecticut and Rhode Island have no county
governments, and Massachusetts has abolished
many of its counties. These three states have no
“unincorporated areas”—every acre in the state
is under the jurisdiction of a city or town effec-
tively acting as a regional government. The
unincorporated portions of New Hampshire
and Vermont are very small, housing just a few
hundred people. Maine still has extensive unin-
corporated areas, but most residents live in an
incorporated city or town.17
Fourth, in states that have not passed
growth-management laws, the federally man-
dated metropolitan planning organizations
have sometimes morphed into true regional
governments. To write an enforceable region-
al plan, MPOs need the approval of a majori-
ty of their members and the willingness on
the part of that majority to use the MPO’s
power to distribute federal funds to coerce
reluctant local governments into cooperat-
ing with the plan. 
For example, in 1999 the chair of the
Minneapolis–St. Paul MPO, Ted Mondale (son
of the former vice president), began promoting
an aggressive growth-management agenda that
called for a strict urban-service boundary and
increased suburban densities instead of further
development at the urban fringe. “If we’re giv-
ing money to communities that are thumbing
their noses” at the MPO’s plan, asked Mondale,
“then what’s it all about? It’s a charade!”18
Despite “spirited community opposition,” the
MPO successfully pressured various suburbs to
rezone areas for much higher densities.19 The
Denver Regional Council of Governments
adopted a similar plan in 1997.20
Lastly, in some cases cities and counties
have jointly developed urban-growth bound-
aries and other growth-management tools
that do not necessarily extend to the entire
metropolitan area. Five years before Washing-
ton passed its growth-management act, King
County (Seattle) adopted an urban-growth
boundary in support of a plan that empha-
sized high-density infill and discouraged
auto-oriented low-density housing.21
In contrast with the above states, most states
in the South (except Florida, Georgia, and
Tennessee), the Midwest (except Minnesota
and Wisconsin), and the interior West (except
Arizona, northwest Colorado, and Salt Lake
City) have done little to promote regional
growth management. That makes it possible to
compare the effects of planning on states and
regions with and without such plans.
Housing Affordability
The question of whether growth manage-
ment reduces housing affordability is hotly
debated by planners and economists.22 As Vir-
ginia Tech urban planning professor Robert
Lang notes, “growth management schemes
exist that can be neutral” with regard to hous-
ing. “But in practice, growth management
generally affects housing prices.”23
In freely functioning markets without
entry barriers, the price of existing housing
cannot rise significantly above the cost of
new construction because, if it did, develop-
ers would enter the market and build new
housing until the price of existing housing
was at least equal to and probably below the
price of new housing. In what is perhaps the
most comprehensive study to date, Harvard
economist Edward Glaeser and Wharton
economist Joseph Gyourko compared a data-
base of local land-use regulations with the
average cost of owner-occupied housing (as a
proxy for the marginal cost of new home con-
struction). They found that, in some parts of
the country, the prices of existing homes are
not significantly different from the nominal
cost of new construction, while in other
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regions existing-home price are well above
the costs of new construction. 
Glaeser and Gyourko used several econom-
ic tests to show that these differences in prices
were not due to a stronger demand for existing
housing in high-priced areas. Instead, they con-
cluded, “Government regulation is responsible
for high housing costs where they exist.”24
However, they did not specifically define what
sorts of regulation was responsible for those
high prices. Instead, they merely attributed it
to “zoning.”
In another paper, Gyourko and two col-
leagues showed that limits on new home con-
struction in growing regions lead wealthy peo-
ple to outbid the poor for the regions’ stock of
housing. The result is that the poor are
pushed out, creating “superstar cities” com-
posed mainly of wealthy people.25 These cities
regard themselves as successful and (ironical-
ly) progressive, when in fact their policies are
highly regressive. 
For example, the San Francisco–Oakland
and Dallas–Ft. Worth metro areas each have
about the same number of families with
incomes greater than $100,000 per year. But
Dallas–Ft. Worth’s affordable housing market
welcomes two-thirds more families with
incomes of $50,000 to $100,000 and twice as
many families with incomes under $50,000 per
year. Dallas–Ft. Worth’s income distribution is
much closer to that of the U.S. as a whole than
San Francisco–Oakland’s.26 This makes San
Francisco–Oakland appear to be a superstar
region, when in fact—thanks to restrictive land-
use rules—it is just an elitist region. As urban
writer Joel Kotkin observes, it is “an oddity”
that “the fashionable ‘left’ defines successful
urbanism by its ability to lure the superafflu-
ent” while it pushes out the poor.27
More than 80 percent of American homes
are in areas that are municipally zoned, but
only about 40 percent of America’s housing
is in unaffordable markets. Some forms of
zoning seem to make housing unaffordable,
while others do not. A close comparison of
affordable and unaffordable housing mar-
kets makes it clear that the difference is
growth-management planning.
Euclidean zoning—zoning that seeks only
to prevent nuisances from disrupting neigh-
borhoods in developed areas—seems to be
compatible with affordable housing. Growth-
management planning—planning and zoning
that seeks to promote the general welfare by
controlling the development of all urban and
rural land within a state or region—makes
housing unaffordable by limiting the amount
of vacant land that is readily accessible for new
housing. 
Looking at Florida’s growth-management
law, Jerry Anthony, an assistant professor of
urban planning at the University of Iowa,
found “a statistically significant increase in the
price of single-family houses attributable to
statewide growth management.” Though
Anthony supports growth-management plan-
ning, he warns, “housing prices could become
the Achilles heel of growth management pro-
grams and thwart their implementation.”28
The basic argument of this paper is that
1. By restricting the amount of land avail-
able for new housing, the number of
permits issued each year, the cost of per-
mits, and/or the amount of time re-
quired to obtain permits, growth-man-
agement planning constrains the supply
of new homes.
2. Because the demand for new housing is
inelastic, small constraints on the supply
of new homes lead to large increases in
the price of those homes.29
3. Sellers of existing homes respond to
increases in the price of new homes by
increasing the prices they ask for their
homes. Thus, small restrictions on the
supply of new homes can lead to large
increases in the price of all homes in a
market. 
As Glaeser and Gyourko found, the median
value of homes in a market is a good indica-
tion of any constraints on the supply of new
homes. In wealthier communities, homes are
likely to be larger or of higher quality. To
account for this, a standard measure of hous-
ing affordability is median home price divided
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by median family income, or price-to-income
ratio. This price-to-income ratio can be used
to detect possible constraints on the supply of
new homes.
Price-to-income ratios determine how long
it would take for a family to pay off a home
under standard lending rules. At a 6 percent
interest rate and a ratio of 3, for example, a
family making a 10 percent down payment
and devoting 31 percent of its income to its
mortgage could pay off the remaining cost of
its home in 15 years. At a price-to-income ratio
of 5 it would take nearly 60 years, which—since
most mortgages are for no more than 30 years
—makes housing unaffordable.
The Census Bureau has estimated median
home values and median family incomes in
each decennial census (for the year before each
census) since at least 1960.30 Since the last
decennial census, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development has annually updated
estimates of median family incomes by metro-
politan area.31 The Department of Commerce’s
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
publishes a quarterly index of home prices by
metropolitan area that can be used to update
median home values.32
Table 1, showing 2006 price-to-income
ratios by state, reveals that all of the states with
growth-management laws have price-to-in-
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Table 1
Median Home Price to Median Family Income Ratios, and Population Growth
Price-to- Growth from Price-to- Growth from
State Income 2000 to 2006 State Income 2000 to 2006
Hawaii 8.7 6.1% Pennsylvania 2.7 1.3%
California 8.3 7.2% Wyoming 2.7 4.2%
District of Columbia 7.3 1.8% Wisconsin 2.7 3.4%
Nevada 5.0 23.6% Georgia 2.5 13.8%
New York 4.9 1.6% North Carolina 2.5 9.6%
Massachusetts 4.8 1.2% Louisiana 2.4 -4.1%
Rhode Island 4.7 1.6% Tennessee 2.4 5.9%
Washington 4.6 8.2% Iowa 2.4 1.8%
New Jersey 4.5 3.4% Michigan 2.4 1.4%
Oregon 4.4 7.8% South Carolina 2.3 7.4%
Arizona 4.4 19.3% Missouri 2.3 4.2%
Maryland 4.3 5.7% Illinois 2.2 3.1%
Idaho 4.2 12.8% Mississippi 2.2 2.2%
Florida 4.2 12.7% Ohio 2.2 1.0%
Virginia 3.8 7.6% Kentucky 2.2 3.9%
Connecticut 3.7 2.7% Arkansas 2.1 4.9%
Colorado 3.7 9.8% Alabama 2.1 3.3%
New Hampshire 3.6 6.0% West Virginia 2.0 0.6%
Utah 3.6 13.7% South Dakota 2.0 3.5%
Delaware 3.5 8.5% Texas 2.0 12.2%
Montana 3.4 4.5% Oklahoma 1.9 3.6%
Vermont 3.4 2.3% Nebraska 1.9 3.2%
New Mexico 3.3 7.3% Kansas 1.9 2.6%
Maine 3.2 3.5% North Dakota 1.8 -0.8%
Alaska 3.1 6.8% Indiana 1.8 3.6%
Minnesota 3.1 4.7%
Source: Census Bureau, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, and Department of Housing and Urban
Development; see notes in text for specific tables and sources.
come ratios of 3 or more except Georgia,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The laws in Geor-
gia and Wisconsin are optional, and housing
in those states is becoming unaffordable in
selected urban areas, notably Savannah, Madi-
son, and Milwaukee. Minnesota’s law is also
optional, and housing there is unaffordable
only in the Twin Cities region. Tennessee’s
1998 law may be too new to have yet influ-
enced housing prices.
Contrary to claims by some that high hous-
ing prices are solely a function of demand,
there is little correlation between growth rates
and price-to-income ratios: Texas and Georgia
are two of the fastest growing states in the
United States, yet they remain very affordable
(see Figure 1).
Georgia and Texas show that homebuild-
ers can readily meet just about any demand for
housing without driving up prices, provided
they can find land for development. Between
2000 and 2006, the Atlanta, Dallas–Ft. Worth,
and Houston metropolitan areas each grew by
more than 130,000 people—approximately the
population of Alexandria, Virginia, or Bridge-
port, Connecticut—per year. At the same time,
low interest rates and easy lending con-
tributed to the most rapid growth in housing
prices ever seen in this country. Yet by 2006
Atlanta’s price-to-income ratio remained an
affordable 2.75, while Houston’s and Dallas–
Ft. Worth’s were very affordable at 2.00 to
2.06.
There is a strong correlation between the
passage of growth-management laws or plans
and declining housing affordability. Table 2
shows the date when price-to-income ratios
first increased above 3.0 in various states and
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Housing Enterprise Oversight, tinyurl.com/2nhr7z.
metropolitan areas. In most cases, declining
housing affordability was preceded by passage
of growth-management laws (which were
optional in Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin) or plans.33
New York state has no regional planning
law, and most of its communities outside the
New York City region are affordable. But the
city is hemmed in by New Jersey to the south
and Connecticut to the northeast, which have
some of the strictest planning laws in the
nation. Suburbs to the west such as Ramapo
pioneered growth-management planning in
1970. In addition, regulation in the city itself
tends to limit further construction of homes
and apartments. That leaves the New York City
urban area with little room to grow. Washing-
ton, D.C., is similarly limited by Maryland’s
planning laws on the north. While Virginia’s
state laws are less strict, many local govern-
ments in Washington’s Virginia suburbs have
imposed building moratoria and growth
boundaries in the form of large-lot zoning of
rural areas.34
Nevada is the exception that tests the rule
that declines in affordability are preceded by
approval of growth-management plans.
Nevada went from being reasonably afford-
able in 1989 and 1999 to dramatically unaf-
fordable in 2006. Las Vegas and Reno are two
of the fastest-growing urban areas in the
nation. In a state where nearly 90 percent of
the land is federally owned, this growth has
relied on sales of federal land to developers.
Those sales slowed after 2000, which led to a
rapid rise in land and housing prices.35
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Table 2
Growth-Management Laws and Plans and Unaffordable Housing
State or Region Law or Plan Year P:I>3
Hawaii 1961 law 1969
California 1963 law 1979
Boulder 1972 plan 1979
Oregon 1973 law 1979
NYC area NJ & CT laws 1979
DC area MD laws and VA plans 1989
CT, MA, RI, NH NE town governments 1989
Seattle/King County 1985 plan 1989
Western Washington 1990 law 1999
Missoula 1992 plan 1999
Denver 1997 plan 1999
Florida 1985 law 2006
Vermont 1988 law 2006
Portland, ME 1989 optional law 2006
Twin Cities 1997 optional law 2006
Baltimore, Hagerstown 1997 optional law 2006
Arizona 1998 law 2006
Madison, Milwaukee 2000 optional law 2006
New Hampshire 2000 law 2006
Nevada Federal land sales slow 2006
Source: Jerry Anthony, “Do State Growth Management Regulations Reduce Sprawl?” Urban Affairs Review 39, no. 3
(2004): 376–97. The year P:I>3 is based on the data in Randal O’Toole, The Planning Penalty: How Smart Growth
Makes Housing Unaffordable (Bandon, OR: American Dream Coalition, 2006), tinyurl.com/yqzpyn and the 2006 data
cited in that paper.
Extensive government ownership of land
has created land shortages and made hous-
ing unaffordable in a few other communities,
such as Jackson, Wyoming; Aspen, Colorado;
and Sun Valley, Idaho. But most expensive
housing markets in the U.S. have plenty of
private land that is physically suitable for
development; it has just been closed to devel-
opment by urban-growth boundaries or
other government restrictions.
These examples show that the key to hous-
ing affordability is the existence of relatively
unregulated private land in unincorporated
areas near to the cities. Thanks to various state
growth-management laws, little or no such
land can be found in Florida, Hawaii, Mary-
land, Oregon, or most of Washington. Thanks
to LAFCos, most unincorporated land in
California is off limits to development.
Thanks to New England’s unusual forms of
local government, little or no unincorporated
land is available in those states. Thanks to
regional growth-management plans, such
land is scarce in Denver, Ft. Collins, Madison,
Milwaukee, Missoula, Seattle, and the Twin
Cities. Thanks to extensive federal ownership,
there is also a shortage of such land in Nevada
and a few other places.
If easily developable vacant land is available
outside of incorporated cities, those cities will
act competitively to minimize their planning
obstacles and invite developers within their
boundaries. That, in turn, will keep housing
affordable. If, through LAFCos, regional gov-
ernments, New England town governments,
or other means, cities can gain control of
development rates in the rural areas, then they
will have far less of an incentive to make devel-
opment easy within their borders. By limiting
competition between municipalities, regional
growth-management planning creates land
and housing shortages.
When planning-induced housing shortages
make housing unaffordable for most people in
a region, planners’ typical response is to pass
ordinances or laws requiring developers to sell
10 to 20 percent of the homes they build to
low-income people at below-market prices.36
Such inclusionary zoning rules may provide
affordable homes for a small number of peo-
ple. But several economic studies have shown
that they further reduce the general level of
housing affordability in a city or region. After
looking at dozens of California communities,
economists Benjamin Powell and Edward
Stringham found that, after these communi-
ties passed inclusionary zoning rules, the num-
ber of homes built fell by an average of 31 per-
cent and homebuilders lost anywhere from
$100,000 to more than $1 million for each unit
they had to sell below cost. The homebuilders
presumably passed most or all of those losses
on to the buyers of the remaining homes they
built.37
The Cost of Regional
Planning
Between 1959 and 1999, price-to-income
ratios in the United States averaged between
2.0 and 2.5. In 1999, they were 2.23. The recent
housing boom pushed the average ratio to 3.4.
In metropolitan areas—heavily weighted with
areas having growth-management planning—
it averaged 3.8, while in rural areas it averaged
only 3.0.
It therefore seems likely that, in the
absence of growth-management planning,
price-to-income ratios in most of the nation
would still be less than 3.0 today, the only
exceptions being places with genuine short-
ages of land. When price-to-income ratios are
inflated because of regional planning, the
difference between actual housing costs and
what they would be without planning is, in
effect, a planning tax imposed on homebuy-
ers. This tax can be conservatively calculated
by comparing actual median home values
with what home prices would be if price-to-
income ratios were 3.0. This is conservative
because price-to-income ratios would proba-
bly be less than 3.0 in many regions were it
not for growth-management planning.
Table 3 shows the planning tax per medi-
an house in selected states and metropolitan
areas. In a few areas, the tax is under $10,000,
but in many more it is above $100,000. In dif-
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ferent parts of the San Francisco Bay Area, it
ranges from $450,000 to more than $700,000.
This is a huge burden to impose on home-
buyers.
The insidious nature of growth manage-
ment is that, by placing restrictions on new
home construction, it affects the prices of all
homes in a region. For example, one source of
the planning tax is impact fees that are intend-
ed to cover the capital costs of infrastructure
such as roads, sewer, water, and schools. These
fees are applied only to new homes but,
because sellers of existing homes base the
prices they ask on the cost of new homes, the
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Table 3
The Cost of Growth-Management Planning
Planning Tax on All Planning Tax on All
Tax Per 2006 Sales Tax Per 2006 Sales
Median Home (millions) Median Home (millions)
States with Growth Management
Arizona 77,400 6,860 Maryland 100,440 7,826
Flagstaff 109,030 150 Baltimore 77,588 2,657
Phoenix 92,144 4,561 Bethesda-Frederick 194,173 2,922
Tucson 53,217 648 Massachusetts 132,647 11,088
California 337,905 126,674 Boston 215,416 4,392
Fresno 143,553 1,135 Cambridge 173,273 3,077
Los Angeles 378,443 29,118 Springfield 35,086 295
Oakland 450,021 12,520 New Hampshire 43,445 893
Sacramento 202,940 4,844 Manchester 25,974 131
San Diego 355,565 10,612 New Jersey 122,145 13,920
San Francisco 718,264 12,369 Atlantic City 95,857 330
San Jose 612,881 11,279 Trenton 47,554 210
Connecticut 59,484 2,846 Newark 161,110 3,904
Hartford 13,061 200 Oregon 84,686 4,316
New Haven 70,266 723 Eugene 68,327 295
Florida 65,324 19,533 Portland 93,737 2,427
Fort Lauderdale 110,070 2,689 Rhode Island 109,475 1,477
Jacksonville 15,685 275 Providence 107,560 2,051
Miami 150,355 3,777 Vermont 25,201 275
Naples 247,149 1,248 Burlington 39,202 109
Orlando 61,503 1,593 Washington 100,237 8,738
Hawaii 382,589 5,406 Seattle 179,776 5,701
Honolulu 394,146 3,242 Spokane 22,800 134
Tacoma 94,830 876
Other Urban Areas with Growth Management Plans
Boulder 101,023 413 Minneapolis-St. Paul 14,848 685
Denver 38,796 1,264 Missoula 70,900 93
Ft. Collins 37,698 147 Madison, WI 9,578 67
Portland, ME 56,300 415 Milwaukee 7,551 143
Source: Author’s caluculations.
Note: The planning tax is a conservative estimate of the additional amount buyers of median-priced homes must pay
because of growth-management planning. The total tax is a conservative estimate of the total additional amounts paid
by homebuyers for houses purchased in 2006. A spreadsheet presenting calculations and results for every state and met-
ropolitan area can be downloaded from tinyurl.com/3bevle.
fees end up increasing the cost of all housing
in a region. If the goal is to recover the capital
cost that new low-density homes impose on
urban service providers, the best solution is a
service district, limited improvement district,
or other financial program that allows devel-
opers or local governments to sell bonds that
would repaid by new homeowners and other
property owners over a 20- to 30-year period.
Monthly or annual payments, instead of a sin-
gle up-front impact fee, would insure that
growth pays for itself without influencing the
general level of housing affordability. 
Table 3 also presents estimates of the total
planning tax paid by homebuyers in 2006. In
the vast majority of cases, this planning tax is
far more than the $11,000 that The Costs of
Sprawl—2000 estimates low-density housing
imposes on urban-service providers. More-
over, the planning tax applies to every owner-
occupied home in a region, not just to new
homes. The estimate of the total planning
tax conservatively assumes that 5 percent of a
region’s housing stock is sold each year. In
fact, in 2006, 5.9 percent of homes in the
nation were sold.38 Note, too, that the total
tax numbers apply only to owner-occupied
homes; if the planning tax were also calculat-
ed for rental housing and non-residential
properties, the total tax would be signifiantly
more. 
Nationally, the total planning-tax paid by
homebuyers in 2006 was close to $250 billion.
About half of this was in California. Most of
the rest was in nine states with statewide
growth-management laws: Arizona, Florida,
Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington. The re-
mainder was in New England, New York City,
and Washington, D.C., and in a number of
other urban areas that have adopted regional
growth-management plans with or without
state growth-management laws.
The planning tax imposed on homebuy-
ers is partly offset by windfall profits for sell-
ers of existing homes. But existing home-
owners who want to trade up to a larger or
better home face the same obstacles as first-
time homebuyers: thanks to regional plan-
ning, the new home they want to buy also
costs much more than it should. Sellers of
new homes, of course, do not earn windfall
profits, because it is the increase in their costs
that makes housing unaffordable. The exis-
tence of windfall profits also raises an equity
issue, as homesellers tend to be wealthier
than homebuyers. 
In effect, growth-management planning
can be interpreted as a cartel of existing home-
owners who limit the supply of new homes in
order to drive up the value of their own homes.
This has been called the homevoter hypothesis.39
While homevoting may be important in main-
taining political support for growth manage-
ment, in a previous paper this writer argued
that it is only one of several factors behind
growth-management planning.40 An addi-
tional factor is municipal finance: cities object
to developments outside their borders because
they want to keep new tax revenues for them-
selves. As this paper has shown, when cities
can gain control over development rates in
rural areas, they respond by imposing growth-
management rules.
Housing Bubbles
Housing bubbles are one of the negative
side effects of regional growth-management
planning. The most recent bubble is often
blamed on low interest rates and easy credit,
but in fact housing prices bubbled mainly in
regions where there were shortages of land
for new housing or other planning-induced
housing shortages. As economist Paul Krug-
man noted in 2005, prices rose most in what
he called “the zoned zone,” where land-use
restrictions make “it hard to build new hous-
es,” while in the rest of the country prices
rose not much faster than inflation.41
At least two economic studies have con-
firmed a relationship between growth-man-
agement planning and housing bubbles. A
2005 economic analysis of the housing mar-
ket in Great Britain, which has practiced
growth management since 1947, found that
planning makes housing markets more
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volatile, that is, more susceptible to booms
and busts. “By ignoring the role of supply in
determining house prices,” the report says,
“planners have created a system that has led
not only to higher house prices but also to a
highly volatile housing market.”42
A more recent study by Harvard econo-
mist Edward Glaeser also finds that land-use
rules that restrict “housing supply lead to
greater volatility in housing prices.” Glaeser
found that, “if an area has a $10,000 increase
in housing prices during one period, relative
to national and regional trends, that area will
lose $3,300 in housing value over the next
five-year period.”43
Historically, U.S. housing prices have grown
at about the rate of inflation.44 Planning-
induced housing shortages lead to bubbles
because housing prices in regions with growth-
management planning rise faster than normal.
This attracts investors—sometimes derisively
termed “speculators”—seeking capital gains. In
extreme cases, this leads to well-documented
frenzies, as when tiny or poorly built homes sell
for unrealistically high prices to “flippers,” that
is, to people who expect to quickly resell at even
higher prices.45 Eventually the bubble deflates,
leading the present situation where home-
builders are forced to cut $100,000 or more
from the prices of their homes.46
In the 380 housing markets for which data
are available, there is a strong correlation
between the price-to-income ratios in 1999
and the increase in housing prices between
1999 and 2006.47 In Atlanta, Dallas, and
Houston, where housing was affordable in
1999, price-to-income ratios grew by only 13
to 24 percent. In California cities where hous-
ing was already very unaffordable in 1999,
ratios grew by 80 to 140 percent. 
The correlation between 1999 affordability
and subsequent price increases is less than per-
fect partly because Florida and other states
that had recently implemented growth-man-
agement laws still had affordable housing in
1999. But by 2006, it was quite unaffordable:
price-to-income ratios in Florida grew by 55 to
150 percent, while ratios in most Georgia
housing markets grew by only 20 to 30 percent.
The United States has experienced hous-
ing bubbles before. A bubble in the late 1970s
saw California and Oregon housing prices
peak in 1980, then fall by about 10 to 20 per-
cent (after adjusting for inflation) over the
next four years. A bubble in the late 1980s
saw prices in California and the Northeast
peak in 1990, then fall by 10 to 20 percent in
the Northeast and 20 to 30 percent in Cali-
fornia over the next six years.48
What is significant about the most recent
housing bubble is that it affected so many more
housing markets than previous bubbles. The
biggest bubbles were in California and Florida,
where price-to-income ratios typically doubled
between 1999 and 2006. But nearly a third of
the nation’s metropolitan areas, representing
nearly 40 percent of the nation’s housing, saw
price-to-income ratios rise by 50 percent or
more. That includes markets in Arizona,
California, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Oregon,
Washington, the New England states, and the
New York, Washington, and Philadelphia met-
ropolitan areas.49
These bubbles and subsequent collapses
are not good for the economy and certainly
not good for people buying homes at artifi-
cially inflated prices. A significant share of
the recent chaos in the lending industry and
stock market can be credited to regional
growth-management planners.
Economic Growth
Planning-induced housing shortages affect
more sectors of the economy than just hous-
ing. Retail, commercial, and industrial devel-
opers all need land, and restrictions on the
amount of land available for their use will
drive up their costs. Businesses in areas with
expensive housing may also have to pay their
employees more than businesses in other areas
to compensate for the higher cost of living.
These increased costs of doing business can
deter employers from building or expanding
in areas with growth-management planning.
There are few more dramatic examples of
this than the San Jose urban area, which grew
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by an average of more than 42,000 people per
year between 1950 and 1970. As the heart of
the nation’s booming high-tech industry,
San Jose could have grown much faster than
it has in the last three decades, but its growth
was inhibited by a growth-management plan
approved in 1974. During the 1970s and
1980s it grew by only 20,000 people per year.
Growth contracted to 10,000 people per year
in the 1990s and less than 8,000 people per
year to date since 2000. 
The imposition of growth-management
plans in coastal California urban areas has
pushed growth into California’s interior.
Since 2000, coastal California metropolitan
areas have grown by an average of 3.5 percent,
while interior metro areas have grown by an
average of 15.5 percent. The data suggest that
price-to-income ratios of 4 or more can sig-
nificantly curtail growth unless that growth
is the result of people and jobs fleeing even
less affordable regions nearby. 
Just as planning-induced land shortages
can make housing markets more volatile, they
can also make job markets volatile. Glaeser’s
study of land-use regulation found that
“places with rapid price increases over one five-
year period are more likely to have income and
employment declines over the next five-year
period.”50
Urban Sprawl
Urban planners say that the most impor-
tant goal of growth-management planning is
to curb urban sprawl. Urban sprawl—the
pejorative term for low-density develop-
ment—reflects the preferences of the vast
majority of Americans to live in a single-fam-
ily home with a yard.51 The United States has
a huge abundance of open space: less than 3
percent of the U.S. is considered urban
(which the Census Bureau defines as “dense-
ly settled areas with a population of 2,500” or
more52), and 95 percent of the nation is rural
open space. Even New Jersey, the nation’s
most heavily developed state, is 65 percent
rural open space.53
So the push for dense housing and hostil-
ity to low densities seems perplexing. As
Urban Land Institute researcher Douglas
Porter notes, there is a “gap between the daily
mode of living desired by most Americans
and the mode that most city planners . . .
believe is most appropriate.” While most
Americans “want a house on a large lot and
three cars in every garage,” planners believe
this leads to a urban development pattern
“that is expensive in terms of public and pri-
vate infrastructure costs, quality of life, and
environmental damage.” Porter’s 1991 paper
urged planners to use regional governments
to impose their goals on reluctant voters.54
Whether curbing sprawl is a worthwhile
goal or not, it is worth asking whether
growth-management planning can achieve
such a goal. University of Iowa planning pro-
fessor Jerry Anthony compared changes in
urban population densities in 11 states that
had passed growth-management laws before
1997 with states that had no similar laws.
Recognizing the growth-management efforts
of LAFCos, he included California among
the states with growth-management laws.
Anthony found that “state growth manage-
ment programs did not have a statistically
significant effect in checking sprawl.”55
In 2001, the Willamette Valley Livability
Forum, a supporter of growth-management
planning, published a report projecting—
with and without such planning—the effects
of development on Oregon’s Willamette
Valley, which covers one-seventh of the state
but houses two-thirds of Oregon’s people.
Based on research by a local economics con-
sulting firm, the report noted that 5.9 per-
cent of the valley was urbanized in 1990. It
projected that, under Oregon’s strict land-
use rules, that would increase to 6.6 percent
by 2050. If, however, those rules were elimi-
nated to “let private property rights and
short-term market forces” determine land
uses, by 2050 the total amount of urbanized
land would cover 7.6 percent of the valley.56
Table 3 shows that, to protect just 1 percent
of the Willamette Valley from development,
Oregon’s land-use rules are costing valley
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(Eugene and Portland) homebuyers $70,000
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Growth-management planning can pro-
foundly change the character of the cities in
which it is practiced. By making housing unaf-
fordable, cities such as San Francisco, Portland,
and Seattle have driven families with children
to suburbs where they can afford a single-fam-
ily home with a yard. In 2000, 26 percent of the
nation’s population was under the age of 18.
But only 14.5 percent of San Franciscans, 15.6
percent of Seattleites, and 21.1 percent of
Portlanders were under 18.57 Although Port-
land’s 2000 population was twice what it was
in the 1920s, Portland schools educated fewer
students in 2000 than in 1925.58
The result is that the central cities are
inhabited largely by young singles and child-
less couples. These people may be more will-
ing to live in higher densities and to walk or
bicycle than older people or families with
children, so planners believe that their plans
are working to reduce driving and sprawl.
But in fact all they are doing is to separate the
population into those who are willing to live
in denser areas and to move to the central
cities, from those who prefer low densities,
who move to the sometimes-distant suburbs.
Conclusion
As it is usually practiced, regional growth-
management planning imposes huge costs
on homebuyers, renters, and businesses. Yet
it provides negligible benefits: it does little to
reduce sprawl (if that can even be considered
a benefit), and its greatest social effect is to
sort urban areas into central cities largely
composed of young singles and childless
couples and suburbs with high percentages
of families with children.
The key to affordable housing is the avail-
ability of relatively unregulated vacant land for
housing and other urban purposes. The effects
of denying homebuilders access to such devel-
opable land appears to be an almost relentless
upward push of housing prices. In 1979, price-
to-income ratios in coastal California cities
were greater than 4. By 1989, they exceeded 5.0.
Thanks to a major recession in the early 1990s,
they were still between 5 and 6 by 1999, but
today they are mostly greater than 8. Prices
may be declining now, but—unless changes are
made—states such as Arizona, Florida, and
Oregon whose price-to-income ratios were 4 or
more in 2006 can expect to have California’s
price-to-income ratios in a decade or two. 
Remedies for unaffordable housing will
require actions at the federal, state, and local
levels.
• The federal government should revoke
requirements that all urban areas must
be represented by metropolitan planning
organizations. Congress should also re-
peal the comprehensive, long-range plan-
ning requirements found in federal
transportation and housing legislation.
• States with growth-management laws
should repeal those laws and other states
should avoid passing similar ones.
• Other state laws that give cities power to
control the rate of development of rural
areas, such as the California law creating
local agency formation commissions,
should also be repealed. Instead, states
should insure that plenty of vacant land
is available to meet each region’s need
for housing and other land uses.
• Local governments should resist efforts
by MPOs and other regional agencies to
impose region-wide planning on their
urban areas.
• As far as possible, infrastructure should
be paid for by developers or property
owners through annual user fees and
special service districts rather than
through up-front impact fees or general
taxation. 
Urban planners, of course, may oppose
these actions. Instead, they aspire to pass
growth-management laws in every state and
impose growth-management plans on every
urban area. The predictable result will be
increasingly unaffordable housing, declining
homeownership rates, and a growing disparity
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between the elite who own their own homes
and a significant number of families who will
never become homeowners.
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